Dense side-by-side comparison of 11 systems across role, range, altitude, interceptors, radar, and operational provenance — built for export into decks and memos. For a lighter entry point, browse the system cards instead.
Swipe to compare →
| System | Type / Role | Range | Altitude | Interceptor(s) | Radar | Key Operators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Iron Dome Iron Dome | Short-range point defense / C-RAM / VSHORAD | 4-70 km (Tamir engagement envelope) VERIFIED | Not published in official sources reviewed UNAVAIL |
| Battlefield radar (specific model not published in official pages reviewed) | Israel |
Swipe to compare →
| System | Type / Role | Range | Altitude | Interceptor(s) | Radar | Key Operators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NASAMS AMRAAM / AMRAAM-ER / AIM-9X-2
UKR combat
| Short-to-medium-range ground-based air defense | Engagement envelope depends on effector; Kongsberg identifies AMRAAM as baseline, AMRAAM-ER as extending engagement volume, and AIM-9X-2 for shorter ranges UNAVAIL | Not published as a normalized NASAMS system-altitude figure in the official sources reviewed UNAVAIL |
| AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel in the standard NASAMS unit described by Kongsberg; configuration can integrate other active and passive sensors | Norway United States Ukraine Australia |
| Sky Sabre CAMM / Land Ceptor / CAMM-ER / Narew | Short-to-medium-range ground-based air defense | 25 km class with CAMM; 40+ km class with CAMM-ER in Narew pathway VERIFIED | Not published in official sources reviewed UNAVAIL |
| Saab Giraffe AMB 3D radar in UK Sky Sabre configuration | United Kingdom Poland |
| IRIS-T SLM IRIS-T SLM / IRIS-T SLS
UKR combat
| Medium-range air-defense system | Up to 40 km VERIFIED | Up to 20 km VERIFIED |
| TRML-4D in the published IRIS-T SLM fire-unit architecture; national configurations are not normalized here | Germany Ukraine Egypt Estonia |
| SPYDER SPYDER SR / SPYDER ER / SPYDER MR / SPYDER LR | Mobile short-to-medium-range air-defense family | Current Rafael materials conflict: one section says SR/ER up to 40 km and MR/LR up to 160 km, while embedded brochure text gives a 20-80 km family band; these are variant/configuration claims, not one normalized SPYDER envelope REPORTED | 6-12 km in the current AiO SR/ER brochure; no clean family-wide normalized altitude figure is published for all variants VERIFIED |
| SR/ER variants mount radar sensor on the C2 unit; MR/LR use separate truck-mounted radar; launchers embed TopLite EO sensor | Philippines Czech Republic |
Swipe to compare →
| System | Type / Role | Range | Altitude | Interceptor(s) | Radar | Key Operators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T / PAC-3 CRI / PAC-3 MSE
UKR combat
| Lower-tier integrated air and missile defense | Public manufacturer sources reviewed do not publish a single normalized Patriot engagement range; envelope depends on interceptor, radar, target, and geometry UNAVAIL | No single normalized public altitude figure was identified in the official sources reviewed; Patriot is a lower-tier air-and-missile-defense system UNAVAIL |
| Patriot radar family; LTAMDS is the U.S. Army’s Patriot-radar modernization programme | United States Germany Ukraine Japan |
| SAMP/T SAMP/T / SAMP/T NG
UKR combat
| Long-range air and missile defense | No single normalized SAMP/T system range is published in the official sources reviewed; legacy Aster 30 descriptions are often reported in the 100 km class UNAVAIL | No single normalized SAMP/T engagement altitude is published in the official sources reviewed; MBDA reported a 2025 Aster 30 B1NT test at a flight altitude beyond 25 km, not a system-wide ceiling UNAVAIL |
| Legacy and NG sensor configurations differ by variant; no normalized radar configuration is stated in the sources reviewed | France Italy Ukraine |
| Barak MX Barak MR / Barak LR / Barak ER | Multi-layer air and missile defense | 35 km, 70 km, and 150 km are selectable interceptor-class ranges, not one Barak MX defended-area radius; overall envelope depends on selected missiles and sensors VERIFIED | Not published in official sources reviewed UNAVAIL |
| IAI/ELTA public material presents MMR, MF-STAR, and ALPHA as integration options; customer-selected sensors can be integrated, and Slovakia’s exact radar fit is not public | Slovakia (contracted) |
Swipe to compare →
| System | Type / Role | Range | Altitude | Interceptor(s) | Radar | Key Operators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| David's Sling David's Sling / SkyCeptor | Mid-tier / medium-range regional missile defense | Not published in official sources reviewed (emphasis on target classes) UNAVAIL | Finland’s procurement requirement specified at least 15,000 m; the reviewed official sources do not publish a normalized maximum system ceiling. VERIFIED |
| AESA multi-mission radar (model not specified in reviewed official sources) | Israel Finland (procuring) |
Swipe to compare →
| System | Type / Role | Range | Altitude | Interceptor(s) | Radar | Key Operators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| THAAD THAAD | Upper-tier ballistic-missile-defense system | Not published in official sources reviewed (emphasis on threat class, not horizontal range) UNAVAIL | Endo/exoatmospheric intercept capability VERIFIED |
| AN/TPY-2 radar; the eighth U.S. battery minimum engagement package was to be paired with one | United States UAE Saudi Arabia |
| Arrow 3 Arrow 3 | Upper-tier ballistic-missile-defense interceptor within the Arrow Weapon System | Not published in official English-accessible sources reviewed UNAVAIL | Arrow 3 is described in reviewed official material as an exo-atmospheric interceptor; no normalized maximum altitude is published. VERIFIED |
| Not clearly published in official English material reviewed | Israel Germany (contracted implementation path) |
Methodology
Matrix 17 v2 inherits its figures from the published system-card archive instead of maintaining a separate standalone fact surface. The live frame now covers allied and export-reference systems with stronger public-source footing, while benchmark peers and Aegis BMD / Ashore stay outside the table until a separate comparison frame is warranted. No classified, export-controlled, or operationally sensitive data is used.
Verified
Confirmed by official manufacturer or government publication.
Reported
Widely cited in credible open-source analysis but not officially confirmed.
Unavailable
No reliable open-source figure identified. Marked for future verification.
Last reviewed: 2026-03-28 — Matrix version 2.0 — Foundry Brief editorial methodology applies to all cells.